During the Vietnam war and in its legacy, perhaps no group of men has created more interest or exhibited more heroism than the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen of the  Studies and Observation Group.  Operating in secrecy and far away from the support of the vast military machine, they were the eyes, ears and the tip of the sword.

MACV-SOG was the joint service high command unconventional-warfare task force engaged in highly classified clandestine opera­tions throughout Southeast Asia. It was given the title "Studies & Observation Group" as a cover. The joint staff was allegedly performing an analysis of the lessons learned to that point in the Vietnam War, but it was actually a special operations group with distinct command decision authority.

  In 1958 the South Vietnamese government created a secret special service directly under their president, which was re-designated the Vietnamese Special Forces Command in 1963. Special operations were conducted by this branch. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported and financed the operations. In April 1964 the government of South Vietnam created the Special Exploitation Service to take over these operations, whereupon MACV-SOG was established to assume the CIA's job of assisting, advising and supporting the new organization in the conduct of highly classified sabotage and psychological and special operations in North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and southern China.  MACV-SOG and the Special Exploitation Service (SES) were activated simultaneously. In September 1967 the South Vietnamese renamed the SES the Strategic Technical Directorate. With the draw down in U.S. personnel and operations, MACV-SOG was deactivated on 30 April 1972 and the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team 158 was activated 1 May 1972 to take its place. This team was subsequently deactivated on 12 March 1973, and no other U.S. headquarters took its place.

  Originally headquartered in Cholon, it moved to Saigon in '1966. However, its air assets (Air Studies Group) were based at Nha Trang and its navy assets (Maritime Studies Group) were based at DaNang with its original Forward Operations Base (FOB 1). The Ground Studies Group launch sites were initially located at Hue-Phu Bai, Khe Sanh, Kham Duc and near Kontum. The MACV-SOG training center and airborne operations group were at Long Thanh. A Psychological Studies Group was located in Saigon with antenna stations at Hue and Tay Ninh.

MACV-SOG was assigned about 2,000 Americans, mostly U.S. Special Forces, and over 8,009 highly trained indigenous troops.  MACSOG had assigned air assets to include the 20th SOS was the "Green Hornet" Huey guns assigned to support the CCS operations out of Ban Me Thuot. The C130s and C123s were part of the 1st Flt Detachment out of CCK Taiwan, the 314th Troop Carrier Wing, (http://hometown.aol.com/SamC130/mc130.html is a website regarding their history) as well as the South Vietnamese 219th H-34 helicopter squadron. 

The U.S. Navy resources included SEAL's, Vietnamese Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) and fast patrol boats. Ground forces included army military intelligence, psychological operations and some 76 ground RT mobile-launch teams, later MACV-SOG reorganized its ground strike elements into three field commands; Command and Control South, Central and North (CCS, CCC and CCN).

MACV-SOG had five primary responsibilities and the capability to undertake additional special missions as required. Primary responsibilities included: (1) Cross-border operations regularly conducted to disrupt the VC, Khmer Rouge, Pathet Lao and NVA in their own territories; (2) Keeping track of all imprisoned and missing Americans and conducting raids to assist and free them as part of the Escape and Evasion (E & E) mission for all captured U.S. personnel and downed airmen; (3) Training and dispatching agents into North Vietnam to run resistance movement opera­tions; (4) "Black" psychological operations, such as establishing false (notional} NVA broadcasting stations inside North Vietnam; (4) "Gray" psychological operations as typified by the Hue- Phu Bai propaganda transmitter. MACV-SOG was also entrusted with specific tasks such as kidnapping, assassination, insertion of rigged mortar rounds into the enemy ammunition supply system (which were set to explode and destroy their crews upon use) and retrieval of sensitive documents and equipment if lost or captured through enemy action. MACV-SOG was often able to use the intelligence it gathered for its own internal purposes as well as for high command special activities.

Command and Control North (CCN) was formed by MACV-SOG in late 1967 as an expansion of its Da Nang Forward Operations Base (FOB) which included launch sites established as early as 1964 at Hue-Phu Bai, Khe Sanh and Kham Duc, CCN, always the largest of the three MACV-SOG field commands, was commanded by a lieutenant colonel.  It was assigned  conduct of classified special unconventional warfare missions into Laos and North Vietnam.  

CCN was organized along the lines of CCC and was composed of Spike recon teams (RT), Hatchet forces and lettered SLAM companies.  Missions into North Vietnam were initiated as early 1 February 1964 under OPLAN 34A.  Operations into Laos commenced in September 1965 as part of Operation SHINING BRASS, renamed PRAIRIE FIRE in 1968.  By this time  MACV-SOG had at its disposal two battalions of American-led Nung tribesmen as reaction forces capable of performing large combat missions.

  In 1971 the Laotian operations were given the code name PHU DUNG, and in March of that year MACV-SOG created Task Force I Advisory Element to replace its three field commands. This task force was located at DaNang.

There was a standard mission which "SCARFACE" flew everyday, mission number 72, which was in support of the Army Special Forces operating as MLT2 out of a FOB (forward operational base) near Quang Tri in far northern I-Corps.

  The Scarface command pilot had control of all the aircraft involved on these missions, which in late 1969 usually consisted of several Army Cobras, several Army Huey slicks, and occasionally a flight of South Vietnamese H-34's from an outstanding squadron with the call sign "Kingbee".  These missions provided insertion, re-supply, medevac, reconnaissance by air, and extraction for teams of CCN operating, usually near the western border of South Vietnam.  We  found it interesting that the Army would consent to a more or less permanent arrangement where a Marine 1st Lieutenant controlled such a large Army air operation.  This speaks well of the esteem in which "Scarface Guns" were held in those days. 

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SEMPER FI AND DE OPPRESSO LIBER

John Meyer, Cliff Newman, and I were privileged to attend the reunion dinner of SCARFACE. During that dinner, we renewed old friendships, made new ones, and thoroughly enjoyed ourselves.

As the former commander of the SOG FOB 1 at Phu Bai in late 68 to its closing in early 69, I spoke about the support that SCARFACE had provided to SOG. I gave only a brief outline of what and where we did our mission. For some who did not know all of what we did, I will try to provide a better understanding of that mission. After 32 years, I may not recall as much, nor as clearly, all of that, but I will try.

SOG was given the mission to do reconnaissance missions in Laos and Cambodia, dating back to 1964. Missions included road/trail/river watches, prisoner snatches, interdictions, sensor implants, wire taps, to salting cache sites with "bad" ammo, and counterfeit monies, among other thing. The core of the ground missions was based around men from the 5^th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Reconnaissance teams (RT's) were usually composed of 12-13 men. 3 US, and the remainder were indigenous, usually Nungs, Montagnard's, Cambodians, or Vietnamese. These were usually mercenaries, recruited and paid by SOG, and commanded y US team leaders.

SOG was a joint services mission, therefore other services were tasked to provide assets to support these missions. For example, at Phu Bai, the daily air support package included 2 USAF FAC's flying O2s, 3 slicks, usually from VNAF 219^th (Kingbees, MAJ An's unit), or 3 Hueys from any of the many Army divisions in the area. And, the Marines, as far back as the siege at Khe Sanh in 68, had been tasked for 2 gunships on a daily basis. James "Crash Kimo" Andrews was flying such support out of Khe Sanh, as were others among you.

The relationship between SOG and the Corps was often strained (putting it mildly) at higher echelons. There was a reason. SOG had been formed by some fine gentlemen, whose covert operations experience began during WWII in the OSS. They used compartmentalization to keep operations as close hold as possible to prevent compromise of missions. Unless an individual had a SOG briefing, and was sworn to absolute secrecy, he was not privy to the raw data, or purpose of the use of his tasked assets. One of the glaring examples of this created a real rift between 1^st MAW and SOG. CG 1^st MAW asked what/where the SCARFACE or Klondike gunships would be doing/going. A SOG major gave him a reply of "Sir, you don't have a need to know!" Of course, he was pissed of to the max. I myself had to give the same reply to GEN Richard Stillwell, an Army general commanding XXIV Corps at Phu Bai. So it wasn't a matter of service, but a matter of clearance to the info. This incident created lots of friction at higher echelons, and a reluctance on the part of the Corps to admit their aircraft were participating in cross border operations against the North Vietnamese Army.

HOWEVER, at the working level, the relationships were quite different! At FOB 1, HML 367 crews were FULLY briefed, and participated fully in the sharing of the information. These men, by virtue of the SOG briefing, could NOT share the information with their own HQ. The men of HML 367 jumped into the mission with all the dedication, determination, skill, and bravery that anyone could ask for. And, all for a bunch of Army grunts. I dare say, this cooperation and mutual admiration between the Corps and the Army has never been as close and good. The missions were never routine, but the spirit among our troops was super.

A mission started with an assignment from SOG to the Command and Control detachment (ours was CCN (North), out of DaNang.) FOB’s were tasked to select and prepare a team. FAC's flew out, selected and photographed an HLZ. Once all team preparation was done, a 6 X 6 KM "no bomb box" was drawn on the map centered on the target area. This info was relayed to as many HQ as possible, including the USAF ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, a C130 in 24 hour orbit over the Laos/Cambodia areas. Call signs were Hillsborough, Moonbeam, Alley Cat, and a couple I no longer remember.) This was done to prevent inadvertent strikes being put in on the team.

A mission was usually scheduled to last 7-10 days. They seldom lasted that long, due to a sophisticated and extensive network of trail/LZ watchers, and trackers. The NVA just didn't like SOG fooling around in their backyard. Normally, the FAC (with SOG observer) took off 30 minutes to an hour before insert time. Checked HLZ, and called for the launch. The SCARFACE guns and Kingbees then left for the insert HLZ.

NORMAL operations had the FAC controlling the USAF air assets, and the SOG rider communicating with the ground team. SCARFACE controlled all helo’s. Once the team was on the ground, all air assets departed. FAC would orbit a few miles away, until the team signaled all okay by breaking squelch.

The FAC would remain airborne as long as fuel allowed. There were many times, that NORMAL ops did not occur. Emergencies for the team usually occurred at the worst possible times. After all assets had departed for the day, nighttime, or foul weather. Those were the times that the SPECIAL relationship between FOB1 and SCARFACE came into play. Because we were both based at Phu Bai, it was a matter of a phone call to 367, or a quick drive in a jeep to their location to announce we had an emergency. The gunships would launch after a quick brief of the situation, and go to the teams assistance. Marine pilots were all instrument qualified, unlike the Army pilots at that time. The gunships were able to help the teams survive the night. At first light, while waiting for the FAC's to arrive at Phu Bai, SCARFACE guns would make a check to see that the team was okay, relay info to the FO, so planning could begin for the extraction. A hurried RTB for refuel, an in-flight brief to FAC and slicks, and SCARFACE led the package in for the exfiltration. Then, if the exfil was 'hot', they provided the suppression until the slicks could get in, or until they went "Winchester". Then, SCARFACE lead would direct TAC air assets for continued suppression of enemy fire. When the ground team was safely out of the HLZ, SCARFACE would assemble the helo’s, and bring them back to Phu Bai.

Usually, if there were light, or no casualties after the exfil, the team would be immediately debriefed, along with the crews of SCARFACE. THEN, at the end of the debrief, all would assemble at the club, and share a few drinks, and the camaraderie between them would grow as only those who shared those hours of terror will ever know.

I know this was a bit long, and it is certainly far more complex than what I can tell you in a limited time. For a more detailed explanation of SOG operations, John Plaster, (MAJ, USA, Retired) has written a book "SOG - The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam." John was a recon team leader, and a FAC rider, so he writes with full knowledge. It is one of the only books that is accurate on the SOG ground missions. If you have any questions, I will be glad to respond. My email is wlshelton@msn.com 

Thanks for having us at your reunion. It was an honor to walk among you. Thanks for all you did!  Bill Shelton, LTCol., USA, Ret.

Colonel Shelton, John Meyers, Major An, Cliff Newman

VMO-3 and subsequently HML-367 along with U.S. Army Aviation units flew insert and extraction missions for these teams.  As with all units involved with supporting special operations, teamwork and routine acts of heroism were commonplace. Often taking place in areas we never were, supporting teams who were not there.  Such was the nature of these missions.

To our friends on both sides of the fence. To those who are still there. 

Click on the banners and show your support for those who fought by our side.

 Semper Fi.

KINGBEES

"One sunny day late in 1969 with "Kingbee" providing the transports we attempted to insert a team near abandoned Marine base at Khe Sahn.  As the lead H-34 settled into a hover in the zone he announced "Kingbee take fire from 3, 6, 9 and 12 o'clock, Kingbee go home now"...  A few days later a group of Kingbee pilots and air crew showed up at our club in Phu Bai.  I asked the pilot if he would trade me a patch.  He said yes, smiled broadly, and cut the patch off the shoulder of his copilot."

"Thirty-one years later, at the Scarface  reunion in San Diego, 2000, I had the great honor of returning that same Kingbee patch to Major An Nguyen.   Earlier that year I had contacted An to interview him about a mission on which he attempted an incredible rescue of two downed Scarface members in a Laotian river and in the conversation I learned from An that none of his 10 or so surviving squadron mates got out of Vietnam with their personal pictures or squadron patches I knew that I must return his patch to him.  We flew him down from San Jose and made him the guest of honor for the reunion, but it all started with the idea of trading squadron patches."

Patch and text courtesy of Mark Byrd